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Cryptographic protocols are the backbone of our information society. This includes two-party protocols which
offer protection against distrustful players. Such protocols can be built from a basic primitive called oblivious
transfer. We present and experimentally demonstrate here the first quantum protocol for oblivious transfer for
optical continuous-variable systems, and prove its security in the noisy-storage model. This model allows to
establish security by sending more quantum signals than an attacker can reliably store during the protocol. The
security proof is based on new uncertainty relations which we derive for continuous-variable systems, that dif-
fer from the ones used in quantum key distribution. We experimentally demonstrate the proposed oblivious
transfer protocol for various channel losses by using entangled two-mode squeezed states measured with bal-
anced homodyne detection. Our work enables the implementation of arbitrary two-party quantum cryptographic
protocols with continuous-variable communication systems.
Quantum cryptography can be used to perform crypto-
graphic tasks with information theoretical security based on
quantum mechanical principles. Most prominent is quan-
tum key distribution (QKD), which allows to implement a
communication link that provides theoretical security against
eavesdropping [1–3]. Yet, there are other practically impor-
tant cryptographic protocols such as oblivious transfer (OT),
bit commitment, and secure password-based identification.
In these so-called two-party protocols, two distrustful par-
ties (Alice and Bob) engage and want to be ensured that the
other party cannot cheat or maliciously influence the outcome.
Hence, in contrast to QKD, security for these protocols needs
not only be established against an outside attacker but even
against a distrustful player.
Because of this more demanding security requirement not
even quantum physics allows us to implement these tasks se-
curely without additional assumptions [4–10]. An assumption
that can be posed on the adversary is to restrict the ability to
store information [11, 12]. As scalable and long-lived quan-
tum memories are experimentally still very challenging this
assumption can easily be justified. In particular, given any
constraint on the size of the adversary’s storage device, secu-
rity for two-party protocols can be obtained by sending more
signals during the course of the protocol than the storage de-
vice is able to handle. This constraint is known as the bounded
and more generally noisy-quantum-storage model [13–15].
Here, we propose and experimentally demonstrate an obliv-
ious transfer protocol based on optical continuous-variable
(CV) systems. These systems, like classical optical telecom-
munication systems, encode information into orthogonal
quadratures of the electromagnetic field. We prove the secu-
rity of the protocol in the noisy-quantum-storage model by es-
tablishing new uncertainty relations, different to the one used
in quantum key distribution. The experimental demonstra-
tion at a telecommunication wavelength is based on an op-
tical CV setup adapted from a recent implementation of CV
QKD [16] which uses entangled two-mode squeezed states
and subsequent homodyne measurements in two random or-
thogonal field quadratures.
While we focus here on OT, which is the basic building
block from which all other two-party protocols can be de-
rived [17], it is possible to use the same techniques to imple-
ment and show security of bit commitment and secure identi-
fication. This can be achieved along the same line as proofs
for similar protocols for discrete variable (DV) encoding into
single photon degrees of freedom (e.g., polarization, path or
time) [18, 19]. Using such an encoding OT has been proposed
and its security has been studied extensively [13–15, 20–
23]. Recently, its experimental demonstration has been re-
ported [19, 24].
In our security proof we derive sufficient conditions for se-
curity against a distrustful party having a quantum memory
with a bounded classical capacity similar to [20]. The main
theoretical ingredients are entropic uncertainty relations for
canonically conjugated observables which we derive with and
without assumptions on the quantum memory’s storage oper-
ation and by modelling the quantum memory as bosonic loss
channel. While we show that security for arbitrary storage
operations is possible, the trade-off in parameters yields very
pessimistic rates due to the absence of a tight uncertainty rela-
tion. We overcome this problem by assuming that the dishon-
est party’s storage operation is Gaussian.
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2I. RESULTS
A. Oblivious transfer in the noisy-storage model
We consider a one-out-of-two randomized oblivious trans-
fer (1-2 rOT) protocol in which Bob learns one out of two ran-
dom bit strings. More precisely, Bob chooses a bit t ∈ {0, 1}
specifying the bit string he wants to learn, while Alice has no
input. Alice’s output are two `-bit strings s0 and s1, and Bob
obtains an `-bit string s˜. A correct protocol satisfies that the
outputs s0 and s1 are independent and uniformly distributed,
and that Bob learns st, i.e., s˜ = st. To implement 1-2 OT from
its randomized version, Alice takes two input strings x0, x1
and sends Bob the (bitwise) sums x0⊕ s0 and x1⊕ s1 mod 2.
Bob can then learn xt by adding s˜ to st ⊕ xt (mod 2) [20].
The protocol we propose here to implement 1-2 rOT re-
quires the preparation of Gaussian modulated quadrature
squeezed states of light. While indeed the protocol can be
implemented using a prepare-and-measure technique, a con-
venient way to prepare such Gaussian modulated squeezed
states is by homodyning one mode of a quadrature entangled
two-mode squeezed state – often referred to as EPR state af-
ter the authors of their 1935 paper, Einstein, Podolski and
Rosen [25]. Such a state can be generated by mixing two
squeezed modes with a balanced beam splitter [26, 27]. In
the following we will use the entanglement based variant to
introduce the protocol.
Before Alice and Bob start the actual protocol, they esti-
mate the parameters of the EPR source and the quantum chan-
nel between them. The EPR source is located in Alice’s lab
who is using balanced homodyne detection to estimate the co-
variance matrix (CM). Alice and Bob then estimate together
the quantum channel they are going to use during the protocol.
This estimation can conveniently be done by determining the
covariance matrix of the EPR source after sending one mode
to Bob. Alice then uses her characterization of the EPR source
to fix αcut > 0 such that the probability to measure a quadra-
ture with an absolute value smaller than αcut is larger than pαcut
(pαcut ≈ 1). In the following, we assume that the optical loss
of the channel is given by µ. The estimated parameters are
further used to choose an appropriate information reconcilia-
tion (IR) code for the protocol. We note that this estimate can
be made safely before the protocol even if one of the parties
later tries to break the security (see [24] for a discussion).
In the protocol, Alice first distributes n EPR states, each of
which is then measured by Alice and Bob who both randomly
perform balanced homodyne detection in one of two orthog-
onal quadratures X and P . We assume that Alice and Bob
share a phase reference to synchronize their measurements.
Alice discretizes the outcomes of the balanced homodyne de-
tection by dividing the range [−αcut, αcut] into 2d bins of equal
length δ indexed by Z = {1, . . . , 2d}. Any measurement
lower than −αcut or larger than αcut is assigned to the cor-
responding adjacent bin in [−αcut, αcut]. Here, it is important
that one uses a homodyne detector with subsequent analog-to-
digital conversion with a precision larger than δ and a range
larger than±αcut. Bob uses the same discretization procedure
after scaling his outcomes of the balanced homodyne detec-
tion with 1/
√
1− µ to account for the losses in the channel.
Note that here all transmitted quantum states are used in the
protocol, while in the single-photon protocol [19, 24] only
successful transmissions are back reported. We denote the
string of the n discretized outcomes on Alice’s and Bob’s side
as Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), respectively.
After completing all the measurements, Alice and Bob wait
for a fixed time ∆t. As we will see later, a malicious Bob who
wants to cheat has to be able to coherently store the modes
in a quantum memory over time ∆t. The rest of the proto-
col consists of classical post-processing and follows the same
idea as the protocol using discrete variables [14, 28]. First,
Alice sends Bob her basis choices θiA for each measurement
i = 1, . . . , n, that is, whether she measured the quadrature X
(θiA = 0) or P (θ
i
A = 1) of the ith mode. According to his
choice bit t, Bob forms the index set It containing all mea-
surements in which both have measured the same quadrature
and the complement I1−t of all measurements in which they
measured different quadratures. Bob then sends the index sets
I0, I1 to Alice upon which both split their strings of measure-
ment results Z and Y into the sub-strings Zk and Yk corre-
sponding to the indices Ik (k = 0, 1). As elaborated in more
detail in the next section, the properties of the EPR source
ensure that Zt and Yt are correlated while Z1−t, Y1−t are un-
correlated.
Alice then uses a one-way information reconciliation code
previously chosen by the two parties and computes syndromes
W0,W1 for Z0, Z1 individually. She then sends W0,W1 to
Bob, who corrects his strings Yt accordingly to obtain Y ′t . The
information reconciliation code must be chosen such that up to
a small failure probability IR the strings Zt and Y ′t coincide.
Finally, Alice draws two random hash functions f0, f1 from a
two-universal family of hash functions that map Z0, Z1 to `-
bit strings s0, s1, respectively. Here, ` is chosen appropriately
to ensure the security of the protocol, see below. Alice then
sends Bob a description of f0, f1 and Bob outputs s˜ = ft(Y ′t ).
B. Correctness of the 1-2 rOT protocol
The OT protocol is correct if Bob learns the desired string,
i.e. st = s˜ and s0, s1 are uniformly distributed. The protocol
is called C-correct if the output distribution of the protocol is
C-close in statistical distance to the output of a perfect pro-
tocol [20]. Thus, C is the failure probability that the protocol
is incorrect.
The correctness condition above only has to be satisfied if
both parties are honest and follow the rules of the protocol. In
that case we can assume that the source and the channel are
known. The EPR source has the characteristic property that
if both parties measure the X (P) quadrature the outcomes are
(anti-)correlated. To turn the anti-correlated outcomes of the
P quadrature measurements into correlated ones, Bob simply
multiplies his outcomes with−1. If Alice and Bob measure in
orthogonal quadratures the outcomes are completely uncorre-
lated. This property of the EPR source implies that the strings
Zt and Yt are correlated while Z1−t, Y1−t are uncorrelated.
For correctness it is important to demand that the informa-
3tion reconciliation code successfully corrects Bob’s string Yt
with a probability larger than 1 − IR. Only after success-
ful correction, i.e., Zt = Y ′t , it is ensured that s˜ = s af-
ter applying the hash function. The properties of the two-
universal hash functions also ensure that the outcomes s0, s1
are close to uniform. By analyzing the security for Alice we
will show that Alice’s outcomes are distributed close to uni-
form even if Bob is dishonest. Thus, if the protocol is A-
secure for Alice (see next section) our protocol is C-correct
with C = IR + 2A [20, 28].
C. Security of the 1-2 rOT protocol
For honest Bob the oblivious transfer protocol is secure if
a malicious Alice cannot find out which string t Bob wants
to learn. The only information Bob reveals during the en-
tire protocol are the index sets I0, I1. However, since hon-
est Bob chooses his measurement basis uniformly at random,
the strings I0, I1 are completely uncorrelated from t. This
property implies that the protocol is perfectly secure for Bob
without any assumption on the power of Alice. In particular,
even if Alice possessed a perfect quantum memory she has no
chance to find out t.
For honest Alice the oblivious transfer protocol is secure
if a malicious Bob can only learn one of the strings s0, s1.
Similarly to the case of correctness we allow for a small fail-
ure probability A that security is not obtained. The precise
composable secure definition of the A-security for Alice that
we employ here is given in terms of the distance to an ideal
protocol that is perfectly secure [20].
The security for a honest Alice requires additional assump-
tions on the power of a malicious Bob to store quantum infor-
mation. Indeed, it is clear that if a malicious Bob has a perfect
quantum memory, he could simply store all the modes until he
receives the basis-choice information from Alice. After that
he can simply measure all modes in the respective basis such
that all the outcomes between Alice and Bob are correlated.
This strategy then allows Bob to learn both strings s0, s1 and
the protocol is completely insecure. But if Bob’s quantum
storage capacity to store the modes over times longer than
∆t is limited, he cannot preserve the necessary correlation re-
quired to learn both strings. By choosing a sufficiently small
output length ` of the hash function the additional correlation
can be erased, and security for Alice can be obtained. The
goal of the security proof in this noisy model is to quantify
the trade-off between the capability of Bob’s quantum mem-
ory and the length ` for which security can be established.
Without restriction of generality we model Bob’s available
quantum storage ability by νn numbers of channels F∆t.
Here, the storage rate ν relates to the size of the available
quantum storage, or also the failure probability to transfer the
incoming photonic state successfully into the memory device.
Additionally, we allow Bob to apply an encoding operation E
before mapping the incoming mode to the input of his storage
device. This encoding map also includes a classical outcome
K that can, for instance, result from measuring part of the
modes. A schematic of Bob’s quantum memory model is il-
…
EPR Pairs 
ℰ ℱ⊗
Z
θA
Qin Qout
KθA
Alice Bob
1
n
υnΔt
FIG. 1. The general form of an attack of dishonest Bob. Alice mea-
sured her mode of distributed EPR pairs with homodyne quadratures
θA, yielding (discretized) results denoted Z. Bob’s memory attack is
modeled by an encoding E that maps (conditioned on some classical
outcome K) the n modes to the memory input Qin. The memory
M is modeled by νn uses of the channel F∆t. We consider the
situations where the encoding E is arbitrary, a mixture of Gaussian
channels or independent and identical over a small numbers of sig-
nals mE .
lustrated in Fig. 1.
We apply here a similar security proof as the one in [20, 28]
for discrete variables (see methods for details). Therein, the
problem of security has been related to the classical capac-
ity Ccl(F∆t) of Bob’s quantum memory channel F∆t. The
other important quantity determining the security is the prob-
ability with which Bob can correctly guess Alice’s discretized
measurement outcome Z given his classical outcome of the
encoding map and the information of Alice’s basis choice.
This probability can conveniently be reformulated in terms
of the min-entropy which is defined as minus the logarithm
of the guessing probability. Furthermore, since we do not
require perfect security we use the -smooth min-entropy
Hmin(Z|θAK) which is defined as the largest min-entropy
optimized over -close states (see, e.g., [29]). We empha-
size that it is sufficient to condition on the classical informa-
tion θA,K due to a relation of the smooth min-entropy of all
the stored information to the question of how many classi-
cal bits can be sent reliably through the storage channel, i.e.,
Ccl(F∆t) [20] (see methods section III B for more details).
A bound on the smooth min-entropy Hmin(Z|θAK) is an
uncertainty relation. To see this link, we can consider the
equivalent scenario in which Bob sends Alice an ensemble of
states {ρk}, where k corresponds to the different instances of
the random variableK. Alice applies on each mode randomly
either a discretized X or P measurement. Heisenberg’s un-
certainty principle tells us that there exists no state for which
Bob can correctly guess both outcomes for X and P . Since
Bob does not know beforehand whether Alice is measuring
X or P , he will always end up with an uncertainty about Al-
ice’s outcomes Z. In the methods (Sec. III A), we derive such
uncertainty relations that allow us to bound
1
n
Hmin(Z|θAK) ≥ λ(δ, n) , (1)
with a state-independent lower bound λ(δ, n). In the above
equation the most crucial difference between the continuous-
and the discrete-variable implementation appears. Indeed,
while for discrete variables an uncertainty relation for BB84
measurements is required, we here need one for discretized
position and momentum observables with finite binning δ.
4We have now all ingredients to state the final results. Let us
assume that the reliable communication rate of Bob’s quan-
tum memory channel decreases exponentially if a coding rate
above the classical capacity Ccl(F∆t) is used. Then, given
that λ satisfies Eq. (1), we obtain an A-secure 1-2 rOT if the
length of the output bit string is chosen as
` ≤ n
2
(λO(A)(δ, n)− rIR − νCcl(F∆t))−O(log 1
A
) . (2)
Here, rIR = (1/n) log |W0W1| is the rate of bits used for in-
formation reconciliation. The explicit dependence on A and
the relation between the security and the classical capacity
Ccl(F∆t)) are given in the methods (section III B). If the right
hand side of Eq. (2) is negative, security for Alice is not pos-
sible.
We see that security can be achieved for sufficiently large
n if λO(A) − rIR − νCcl(F∆t) is strictly larger than 0. In
other words, we need that the uncertainty generated by Alice’s
measurements should be larger than the sum of the leaked in-
formation during information reconciliation and the storage
capacity of Bob. It is thus essential to find a tight uncertainty
relation Eq. (1). We derive such an uncertainty relation in the
methods (section III A). It turns out that it is difficult to de-
rive a tight bound without further assumptions. This is partly
due to the fact that no non-trivial uncertainty relation exists
for continuous X and P measurements, i.e., if δ goes to 0.
The uncertainty relation has thus to be derived directly for
the discretized X and P measurements. We therefore also
derive uncertainty relations under different assumptions on
Bob’s encoding operation E , namely, under the assumption
that the encoding operation is a Gaussian operation and un-
der the assumption that the encoding operation acts indepen-
dent and identically on a limited number of modes mE . For
the explicit form of the uncertainty relations, we refer to the
methods (section III A).
D. Security for realistic memory devices
Let us analyze the security in the case that Bob’s quan-
tum memory can be modeled by a lossy bosonic channel Nη ,
where η denotes the transmissivity. The classical capacity of
this channel has only recently been determined after settling
the minimal output entropy conjecture [30, 31]. If the average
photon number of each code word is smaller than Nav, it is
given by g(ηNav), where g(x) = (x + 1)g(x + 1) log2(x +
1)− x log2 x. An energy constraint is necessary as otherwise
the capacity is unconstrained due to a memory that is infinite
dimensional.
Recall that we further require that the success probability
for reliable communication must drop exponentially to ap-
ply the security proof. It has been shown that for this to be
the case a constraint on the average number of the photons is
not sufficient but one has to impose that every code word is
with high probability contained in a subspace with maximally
Nmax photons [32]. Under this maximal photon number con-
straint the reliable communication vanishes exponentially at
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FIG. 2. Oblivious transfer security regions obtained for different as-
sumptions imposed on the encoding operation of malicious Bob’s
quantum memories. We plot optical efficiency η of the quantum
memories versus the logarithm to basis 10 of the quantum memory
storage rate ν. Security is obtained for all values of ν and η marked
by the colored regions. The green region is obtained under the as-
sumption that the encoding is Gaussian (n = 2 × 105, β = 0.944,
δ = 0.1), the blue region under the assumption that the encoding is
independent and identical over at most mE = 10 modes (n = 108,
β = 0.944, δ = 0.1), and the red region without any assumption,
i.e. arbitrary encodings (n = 108, β = 0.98, δ = 1.0). The plots
are obtained for an EPR source with two-mode squeezing of 12 dB
and losses on Alice’s and Bob’s side of 3% and 6%, respectively.
Further parameters: A = 10−7, αcut = 51.2 and Bob’s maximal
photon number in the encoding is smaller than 100.
a rate above the classical capacity g(ηNmax) [32–34], so that
we can apply our security proof with Ccl(F∆t) = g(ηNmax).
We plot in Fig. 2 under which assumptions on Bob’s quan-
tum storage device security can be obtained. In particular, we
consider the situation of arbitrary encoding operations, the sit-
uation that Bob’s encoding operation is a Gaussian operation,
and the situation that Bob’s encoding operation is independent
and identical over blocks of at most 10 modes. To obtain secu-
rity, i.e. a positive OT rate, for arbitrary encoding operations,
it is necessary to have an information reconciliation code with
almost perfect efficiency β ≈ 1. The information reconcil-
iation efficiency describes the classical communication rate
compared to the asymptotic optimal value, where the latter is
achieved for β = 1. Current codes for CV systems can reach
about β ≈ 0.98 [35, 36]. The weakest requirements on the pa-
rameters have to be imposed under the Gaussian assumption
in which security can already be obtained for low numbers of
signals n ≈ 105. Under the independent and identical encod-
ing assumption, larger numbers of transmitted signals n are
required to obtain security under similar conditions as in the
case of Gaussian operations.
In general, to obtain security a transmittance of the channel
between Alice and Bob larger than 0.5 and non-trivial squeez-
5ing is required. This result is easily obtained if one takes the
asymptotic limit for n to infinity under Gaussian or the iden-
tical and independent encoding operations. We note that the
identical and independent assumption is no restriction of gen-
erality any more in the asymptotic limit [37].
E. Experimental demonstration of 1-2 rOT
We performed an experimental demonstration of the 1-
2 rOT protocol using the experimental setup employed for
CV QKD in [16] and sketched in Fig. 3a. The EPR source
was located at Alice’s location and consisted of two inde-
pendent squeezed-light sources each producing continuous-
wave squeezed vacuum states at 1550 nm by parametric down-
conversion [27]. Both states were interfered at a balanced
beam splitter with a relative phase of pi/2 thereby exhibiting
more than 10 dB entanglement according to the criterion from
Duan et al. [38]. Alice kept one of the entangled modes and
performed balanced homodyne detection. The homodyned
quadrature amplitude was chosen randomly according to ran-
dom bits generated by a quantum random-number generator
based on homodyne measurements on vacuum states. The
other entangled mode was sent to Bob via a free-space chan-
nel along with a bright local oscillator beam which served as
phase reference. Optical loss in this channel was simulated
by a variable beam splitter comprising a half-wave plate and
a polarizing beam splitter. Bob performed balanced homo-
dyne detection on his mode with a random quadrature chosen
by a similar quantum random-number generator. The mea-
surement repetition rate of the system was 100 kHz. For more
experimental details we refer to the methods (section III C)
and [16].
The classical post-processing was implemented as de-
scribed in Section I A. We chose the number of exchanged sig-
nals to be 2.03×105 such that the number of measurement re-
sults where both parties have measured in the same bases and
where both parties have measured in different bases are both
larger than 105 with high probability. We then chose from
each set the first 105 for post-processing (i.e., n = 2 × 105)
to keep the block size of the information reconciliation code
constant. For the discretization of the measurement outcomes,
we used αcut = 51.2 and δ = 0.1, obtaining symbols from an
alphabet of size 1024 corresponding to 10 bit per symbol.
The most challenging part is the information reconciliation
for which we used a similar strategy as in [16] and detailed
in [36]. Here, Alice first communicated the four least signif-
icant bits of each symbol in plain to Bob. To correct the re-
maining 6 bits, she then used a non-binary low-density-parity-
check (LDPC) code with field size 64 and a code rate R com-
patible with the estimate of the correlation coefficient ρ from
the CM. After Bob has received the syndrome corresponding
to his input bit t (ignoring the data corresponding to bit 1− t)
he ran a belief propagation algorithm to correct Yt. In Table I
we summarize the used code-rates for the different loss sce-
narios in our experiment. The two-universal hash functions
were implemented using Toeplitz matrices.
The correctness parameter C of the protocol depends on
Loss σA ρ capacity R rIR β FER
0 4.838 0.9960 3.486 0.94 4.36 0.942 0/985
3% 4.238 0.9936 3.151 0.92 4.48 0.943 0/1083
6% 4.535 0.9932 3.101 0.90 4.60 0.951 0/985
9% 4.556 0.9923 3.013 0.88 4.66 0.941 1/1182
12% 4.637 0.9916 2.950 0.87 4.78 0.950 0/1083
15% 4.584 0.9903 2.846 0.85 4.90 0.937 0/1358
TABLE I. Mean values for channel loss, standard deviation of Al-
ice’s data σA, correlation coefficient ρ, channel capacity, code rate
R of LDPC codes over GF(64) used, corresponding leakage rate rIR,
efficiency β and frame error rate (FER).
the probability of successful information reconciliation. From
the given frame error rates in Tab. I, we deduce a success rate
of larger than 99.9 %, i.e. IR = 10−3, limited by the amount
of taken experimental data. The single frame error for 9 %
channel loss is thereby due to an error which prevents conver-
gence of the LDPC decoder. The average overall efficiency of
the information reconciliation was 94.4 %. While generally
possible, the temporal drift of the experimental setup in com-
bination with the requirement of achieving a low frame error
rate prevented a higher efficiency.
The results are shown in Fig. 3b. We computed the secu-
rity under the Gaussian assumption. The points correspond
to the experimental implementation and the theoretical lines
were computed using the estimated CM and the efficiency of
the information reconciliation protocol used with the lossless
channel. We see that for short distances, rates in the order of
0.1 bit per transmitted quantum state are possible. The maxi-
mal tolerated loss in the communication channel heavily relies
on the assumptions on malicious Bob’s storage rate, which we
set to ν = 0.01 and ν = 0.001 in Fig. 3b.
II. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We presented and experimentally demonstrated a protocol
for oblivious transfer using optical continuous-variable sys-
tems, and showed security against a malicious party with an
imperfect quantum storage device. For the implementation
we used a strongly entangled two-mode squeezed continuous-
wave light source, and balanced homodyne detection together
with a quantum random-number generator for the measure-
ments. However, security can also been obtained with weaker
entangled sources than used in our experiment such that on-
chip entanglement sources are possible [39].
The secure bit rate of the OT protocol is in trade-off with as-
sumptions on the quantum storage device of a dishonest party.
In particular, it depends on the classical capacity of the stor-
age device Ccl and the storage rate ν. The storage rate is de-
termined by the size of the available quantum storage and the
success rate for transferring the photonic state into the quan-
tum memory. To obtain security for any storage size, one can
simply increase the number of signals sent during the proto-
col. The classical capacity is determined by the efficiency of
the quantum memory for writing, storing (over time ∆t) and
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FIG. 3. Experimental setup and results. a) Squeezed light at 1550 nm
was generated in two parametric down-conversion sources and super-
imposed at a 50:50 beam splitter to obtain entanglement. One mode
was kept locally by Alice and measured with homodyne detection
randomly in the amplitude and phase quadrature. The other mode
was sent through a free-space channel simulated by a half-waveplate
and a polarizing beam splitter (PBS). Bob then performed homodyne
detection randomly in amplitude and phase quadrature. PD: Photo-
diode, LO: Local Oscillator. b) Secure OT rate per signal obtained
in the experiment. Points correspond to the generated OT rates in
the experiment for two different storage rates, ν = 0.001 (red) and
ν = 0.01 (blue), for quantum memories with a transmittance of 0.75.
The lines show simulated OT rates obtained by applying a one-sided
loss channel with losses µ to the estimated two-mode squeezed state
in the experiment. Parameters: n = 2 · 105, αcut = 51.2, δ = 0.1,
A = 10
−7, and Bob’s maximal photon number in the encoding is
smaller than 100.
reading out.
For short distances (i.e., low channel losses), we obtain
rates that are about a magnitude larger than those achieved
in the DV case [24] while using significantly smaller block
sizes of about 105 compared to 107. However, our implemen-
tation is susceptible to losses and requires the optical loss to be
generally less than 50%. For practical purposes even a lower
loss threshold is encountered. For instance, in our experiment
losses below 26% for ν = 0.01 and 32% for ν = 0.001 are
necessary (see Fig. 3).
Information reconciliation is required to correct the dis-
cretized (non-binary) data. In contrast to the case of DV,
where conditioned on the arrival of a photon the bit-error rate
is rather low, we require efficient information reconciliation
for non-binary alphabets with high probability of success, i.e.
low block error rate, since a check ensuring that information
reconciliation was successful will in contrast to QKD com-
promise security.
The security proof presented here can be adapted to other
two-party cryptographic protocols such as bit commitment
and secure identification using similar ideas and protocols as
in [13, 19, 20, 28]. Moreover, the security proof can be re-
fined in various directions. Firstly, our security is related to
the classical capacity of a malicious party’s quantum memory.
However, conceptually, the security of the protocol relies on
the ability to store quantum information coherently so that a
reduction to the quantum capacity or a related quantity would
be desirable. This relation has recently been shown for DV
protocols using the entanglement cost [21] and the quantum
capacity [22, 23, 40], but its generalization seems challeng-
ing for CV protocols as properties of finite groups have been
used. Secondly, it is important to derive tight uncertainty rela-
tions that hold without additional assumptions. Having such a
relation would remove the current constrained on the encod-
ing operation into the quantum memory. Finally, it would be
interesting to clarify if OT can be implemented securely in
the noisy-storage model using only coherent states. Although
squeezing or entanglement is necessary in our security proof,
it is not clear whether this is due to our proof technique or
whether it is a general requirement.
III. METHODS
A. Smooth min-entropy uncertainty relations for continuous
variables
The security of OT in the noisy-storage model relies
on tight uncertainty bounds λ on the smooth min-entropy,
Eq. (1) [41] (for the details why this is the decisive quantity
see method section III B). As discussed in the main text we
can think of dishonest Bob preparing an ensemble of states
{ρkAn}k according to K. Here, An indicates that Alice (A)
holds the n modes sent by Bob. A restriction on the encod-
ing map E translates to a restriction on the ensemble. Clearly,
without any restriction on E there is no restriction on ρkAn . If
E is a Gaussian operation, then each ρkAn is a mixture of Gaus-
sian states, since the source distributed by Alice is Gaussian.
Note that mixtures have to be considered since combining two
or more values of K into one is a simple operation. And fi-
nally, if E acts independently and identically over only mE
modes, then each ρkAn is identical and independent over mE
modes since the source is assumed to be identical and inde-
pendent for each mode.
Uncertainty relation without assumptions. Because of the
maximization in the definition of the smooth min-entropy over
close-by states, it is very difficult to bound it directly. Instead,
it is convenient to follow the idea from [42] and to use the fact
that it can be related to the conditional α-Rényi entropies de-
fined as Hα(A|B)ρ = 11−α log tr[ραAB(idA ⊗ ρB)1−α]. In
7particular, it holds for α ∈ (1, 2] and any two finite ran-
dom variables X and Y that Hmin(X|Y ) ≥ Hα(X|Y ) −
1/(α− 1) log 2/2 [43]. This relation can be generalized to
discrete but infinite random variables using the approximation
result from [44]. We then obtain a lower bound on the smooth
min-entropy with
λ(δ, n) = sup
1<α≤2
(
Bα(δ, n)− 1
n(α− 1) log
2
2
)
(3)
if (1/n)Hα(Z|θ) ≥ Bα(δ, n) holds. Moreover, it suffices to
find a bound for n = 1, as Bα(δ, n) = nBα(δ, 1) [42].
We denote in the following by {xl} and {pl} (l ∈ N) the
probability distribution of the discretized X and P measure-
ment. Using the definition of the α-Rényi entropy, one finds
that 2(1−α)Hα(X|θ) = 12 (
∑
k x
α
k+
∑
l p
α
l ) . Since the distribu-
tions xk and pk are discretized X and P distributions that are
related by Fourier transform, they satisfy certain constraints.
For instance, it is not possible that both have only support a
finite interval.
A precise formulation of the constraint for the probabili-
ties x[I] and p[J ] to measure X in interval I and P in in-
terval J has been given by Landau and Pollak [45]. They
proved that these probabilities are constrained by the in-
equality cos−1
√
q[I] + cos−1
√
p[J ] ≥ cos−1√γ(|I|, |J |).
Here, |I| denotes the length of the interval I , and γ(a, b) :=
ab/(2pi~)S(1)0 (1, ab/(4~))
2 with S(1)0 the 0th radial prolate
spheroidal wave function of the first kind. For ab sufficiently
small γ can be approximated by γ(a, b) ≈ ab/(2pi~).
The above constraint on q[I] and p[J ] can be reformulated
in the following way [46]: (i) if 0 ≤ q[I] ≤ γ(|I|, |J |), then
all values for p[J ] are possible, and (ii) if γ(|I|, |J |) ≤ q[I],
then p[J ] ≤ g(q[I], |I|, |J |) for g(q, a, b) := [√qγ(a, b) +√
(1− q)(1− γ(a, b))]2. This yields an infinite number of
constraints for {ql} and {pl}. Let us assume that {ql} and
{pl} are decreasingly ordered, then for all M,N ∈ N it has to
hold that
N∑
j=1
pkj ≤ g
( M∑
i=1
qi,Mδ,Nδ
)
. (4)
It is challenging to turn the above constraints into an explicit
and tight upper bound for the α-Rényi entropy. In the follow-
ing we discuss a possible way that connects the above con-
straints with a majorization approach.
Let us denote by {rj} the decreasingly ordered joint se-
quence of both distributions {ql} and {pl}. Then, we can
write 2(1−α)Hα(X|θ) = 12
∑
j r
α
j . Since the function r 7→∑
j r
α
j is Schur convex, it can be upper bounded by any se-
quence wj majorizing rj . Such a wj can be constructed in a
way shown in [47].
First, note that condition (ii) above implies that q[I] +
p[J ] ≤ q[I] + g(q[I], |I|, |J |). Optimizing the right hand side
over all 0 ≤ q[I] ≤ 1, we obtain the constraint q[I] + p[J ] ≤
1+
√
γ(|I|, |J |). This then implies that∑nj=1 rj ≤ 1+Fn(δ),
where Fn(δ) = max1≤k≤n
√
c (kδ, (n− k)δ). Here, the
maximum is attained for k = bn2 c.
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FIG. 4. Uncertainty bound without assumptions (red, solid), under
the identical and independent (i.i.) assumption overmE = 10 signals
(blue, dashed-dotted) and under Gaussian assumptions (green, long-
dashed) depending on the binning size δ. n = 108, A = 10−7. We
see that the best bound is obtained under the Gaussian assumption.
Moreover, the bound without assumption is very loose for small δ.
We can now construct a majorizing sequence w by set-
ting recursively w1 = 1 and wk = Fk − wk−1 for k ≥ 2.
The obtained bound on the α-Rényi-entropy is then given by
BαMaj =
1
1−α log
(
1
2
∑
k w
α
k
)
. According to Eq. (3), this trans-
lates into a bound on the smooth min-entropy given by
λMaj := sup
1<α≤2
(
BαMaj −
1
n(α− 1) log
2
2
)
. (5)
A plot of the bound is given in Figure 4. We emphasize that
the obtained bound seems not very tight, especially for small
δ. We believe that this problem is due to the fact that the way
how the majorizing sequence is constructed does not exploit
all the possible constraints.
a. Uncertainty relation under Gaussian assumption. In
order to obtain an improved uncertainty relation we assume
that the states ρkAn are mixtures of Gaussian states. Similarly
as before, we derive a bound for the α-Rényi entropy with
α ∈ (1, 2] and use Eq. (3) to obtain a bound on the smooth
min-entropy. This argument implies that it is again sufficient
to consider the case n = 1.
Let us first assume that the state is Gaussian such that the
continuous probability distributions x(s) and p(s) of the X
and P measurements are Gaussian. We denote the standard
deviations of the X and P distribution by σX and σP , respec-
tively. Using Jensen’s inequality we can upper bound xαk =(∫
Ik
x(s)ds
)α
≤ δα−1 ∫
Ik
x(s)αds, where Ik denotes the in-
terval corresponding to the bin k. Taking now the sum over all
bins we arrive at
∑
k x
α
k = δ
α−1 ∫ x(s)αds =: g(σ˜X), where
g(x) = 1/[(
√
2pix)α−1] and σ˜X = σX/δ is the relative stan-
dard deviation of the Gaussian distribution x(s).
Note that the bound g(σ˜X) becomes very lose if σ˜X is
very small and can even become larger than the trivial up-
per bound 1. We avoid that problem by simply bound-
ing
∑
k q
α
k ≤ min{g(σ˜X), 1}. The same applies to the
P quadrature yielding the upper bound
∑
k q
α
k +
∑
l p
α
l ≤
min{g(σ˜X), 1} + min{g(σ˜P ), 1}. We can now apply Ken-
nard’s uncertainty relation for the standard deviations of X
and P to obtain σ˜X σ˜P ≥ ~/(2δxδp) [48]. Optimizing
8min{g(σ˜X), 1} + min{g(σ˜P ), 1} over all possible σ˜X , σ˜P
gives 1 + (δ2/(pi~))(α−1)/α. Hence, we find for Gaussian
states the uncertainty relation Hα(Z|θ) ≥ BαGauss(δ, n) with
BαGauss(δ, n) :=
n
1− α log
1
2
(
1 +
1
α
(
δxδx
pi~
)(α−1))
. (6)
This relation then leads to a bound on the smooth min-entropy
with λGauss(n) via Eq. (3). The improvement over the previous
bound can be seen in Fig. 4.
Let us finally show that this relation also holds for arbi-
trary mixtures of Gaussian states. Let us take ρ =
∑
y µyρ
y
with probability µy and ρy a Gaussian state for any y. We
then obtain that
∑
k x
α
k =
∑
k(
∑
y µy
∫
Ik
xy(s)ds)α ≤∑
k
∑
y µy(
∫
Ik
xy(s)ds)α =
∑
y µy
∑
k(x
y
k)
α. Here we de-
note by xy the X probability distribution of ρy , and we used
the concavity of the function x 7→ xα. This argument shows
that the above uncertainty relation extends to arbitrary (even
continuous) mixtures of Gaussian states.
Uncertainty relation under identical and independent as-
sumption. Let us assume that each ρkAn has tensor product
structure ρkAn = (σ
k
AmE )
⊗n/mE , where we assume that n/mE
is an integer. It is known that if n/mE goes to infinity, the
smooth min-entropy converges to the Shannon entropy [49,
50]. More precisely, we can lower bound 1nH

min(Z
n|θn) by
1
mE
H(ZmE |θmE )− 4
√
mE
n
log(η(ZmE ))2
√
log
2
2
, (7)
where η(ZmE ) = 2+2H1/2(Z
mE ). This relation has also been
shown for infinite-dimensional alphabets in [44]. If we as-
sume that Alice knows the covariance matrix of her reduced
state, we can bound H1/2(ZmE ), and thus, η(ZmE ). It there-
fore remains to find a lower bound on the Shannon entropy
H(ZmE |θmE ).
For simplicity let us assume that mE = 1. Because the
measurement choice θ is uniformly distributed, we find that
H(Z|θ) = 1/2(H(Xδ) + H(Pδ)). Thus, we recover the
usual entropic uncertainty relation for the Shannon entropy
which has been extensively studied. In particular, it has been
shown that H(Xδ) + H(Pδ) ≥ log(epi~/δ2) [51]. It is easy
to see that in the case of an arbitrary mE , we similarly obtain
H(ZmE |θmE ) ≥ m/2 log(epi~/δ2). In conclusion, we arrive
at an uncertainty relation with
λIID(δ, n) = −
1
2
log c(δx, δp) (8)
− 4
√
mE
n
log(η(ZmE ))2
√
log
2
2
. (9)
B. Security proof for 1-2 rOT against a memory-restricted
malicious Bob
The security proof for an honest Alice is similar to the one
in [28], which is using key results from [18, 20]. The main
difference is that we have to include the information reconcil-
iation leakage, and to take into account that Bob’s quantum
memory can be infinite-dimensional and that K can be con-
tinuous. According to the protocol, we can assume that Alice
is distributing a state ρAB , A = A1, . . . , An, for which
tr
(
ρAi(q[−αcut, αcut])
) ≥ pαcut , (10)
tr
(
ρAi(p[−αcut, αcut])
) ≥ pαcut (11)
holds for any mode i. As in the main text Z denotes Al-
ice’s discretized measurement outcomes with the binning
(−∞,−αcut+δ], (−αcut+δ,−αcut+2δ], . . . , (αcut−2δ, αcut−
δ], (αcut−δ,∞). Note, that αcut is an integer multiple of δ. We
further introduce Z˜ as the string of outcomes if Alice would
measure a uniform binning of δ over the entire range R (as
used in the derivation of the uncertainty relations).
To ensure composable security for Alice, we have to show
that for any memory attack of Bob, there exists a random vari-
able D in {0, 1} such that conditioned on D = d, Bob does
not know sd with probability larger than 1 − A [20]. Denot-
ing by B′ all the classical and quantum information held by a
malicious Bob at the end of the protocol, this condition can be
formulated by using the trace norm
‖ρSDSD¯DB′ − τSD ⊗ ρS(1−D)DB′‖1 ≤ A, (12)
where τSD denotes the uniform distribution over SD. We use
lower indices to indicate the relevant systems, that is, the over-
all state of a joint system with quantum information A,B
and classical random variables X,Y is denoted by ρABXY .
Hence, if X is a random variable, ρX denotes its distribution,
ifA is a quantum system, ρA denotes its quantum state, and its
combination ρXA can conveniently be described by a classical
quantum state.
Recall that s0, s1 are obtained by hashing the substrings
Z0, Z1. Choosing the length ` of the bit strings s0, s1 suffi-
ciently small has the effect of randomization and destruction
of correlation, i.e., establishing Eq. (12). More precisely, the
condition from Eq. (12) is satisfied if [52]
` ≤ H1min(ZD|SD¯DB′)− 2 log2
1
A − 41 (13)
and we can optimize over 0 < 41 < A. The crucial dif-
ference to the discrete-variable case is that the above rela-
tion holds even if Bob’s quantum memory is modeled by an
infinite-dimensional system.
Bob’s information B′ consist of the state of his quantum
memory Q and his classical register K (see Fig. 1), Alice’s
basis choice θA, and the information reconciliation syndrome
W = (W0,W1). The next goal is to remove the conditioning
on the quantum system by relating it to the classical capacity
of Bob’s quantum memoryF⊗νn∆t . For this step we use the key
result from [20] which says that H1min(ZD|SD¯DQKθAW ) is
larger than minus the binary logarithm of
PF
⊗νn
∆t
succ
(bH2min(ZD|DKθAW )− log2 1(1 − 2)2 c) , (14)
where PF
⊗νn
∆t
succ (`) is the success probability to send ` bits
through the channel F⊗νn∆t . Again, we have the freedom to
9optimize over all 0 < 2 < 1. The above result, orig-
inally proven for finite dimensions, can easily be extended
to infinite-dimensions using the finite-dimensional approxi-
mation results from [44]. For the following, we will assume
that the reliable transmission of classical information over the
channel F∆t decays exponentially above the classical capac-
ity, i.e., PF
⊗n
∆t
succ (nR) ≤ 2−ξ(R−Ccl(F∆t)), usually referred to as
a strong converse.
The final step is to lower bound the smooth min-entropy of
ZD given DKθAW in Eq. (14). It is convenient to use the
min-entropy splitting theorem [14] saying that for given two
random variables Z0, Z1, there exists a binary variableD such
that the smooth min-entropy of ZD givenD is larger than half
of the smooth min-entropy of the two strings together, that
is, Hmin(ZD|DKθAW ) ≥ 12Hmin(Z0Z1|KθAW )− 1. This
theorem defines retrospectively the random variable D. The
conditioning on the information reconciliation syndrome W
can be removed by simply subtracting the maximum infor-
mation contained in W given by nrIR = log2 |W |. Before
we can apply the uncertainty relation, we have to eventually
relate the entropy of Z by the one of Z˜. This is necessary
since a state-independent uncertainty relation cannot be satis-
fied for quadrature measurements with a finite range. But due
to the condition that αcut is chosen such that the probability
to measure an event outside the measurement range is small,
we can bound [53] the 2-smooth entropy of Z given by the
(2−αcut)-smooth entropy of Z˜, where αcut =
√
2(1− pnαcut).
Note that this step requires that αcut < 2 < A/4. Since
the probability that Alice measures an outcome with absolute
value larger than αcut only depends on her reduced state, the
same holds conditioning on K and θA [53].
Hence, given that the uncertainty relation from Eq. (1)
holds, we find that A-security for Alice as in Eq. (12) is sat-
isfied, if we choose
` =
n
2
ξ(rOT − νCcl(F))− log 1
A − 41 , (15)
where
rOT :=
1
2
(
λ2−αcut (n)− rIR − 2
n
(log
1
(1 − 2)2 + 1)
)
.
(16)
The length ` can be optimized over all 1, 2 ≥ 0 arbitrary
such that A > 41 > 42 > 4αcut . We then obtain Eq. (2)
in the main text for a Gaussian loss channel satisfying ξ =
1 [32].
C. Experimental Parameters
The squeezed light sources were pumped with 140 mW
and 170 mW, respectively. The local oscillator power for
Alice’s and Bob’s homodyne detector was 10 mW each
yielding a vacuum-to-electronic-noise clearance of about
18 dB. The quantum efficiency of the photo diodes was
99 %, the homodyne visibility 98 %. The phase of the local
oscillators was randomly switched at a rate of 100 kHz
between the amplitude and phase quadrature using a fiber
coupled waveguide phase modulator. For further details we
refer to [16].
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Anthony Leverrier, Loïck Magnin
and Frédéric Grosshans for useful discussions about the
continuous-variable world. FF is supported by the Japan Soci-
ety for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) by KAKENHI grant
No. 24-02793. TG is supported by the Danish Council for
Independent Research (Individual Postdoc and Sapere Aude
4184-00338B). CS is supported by a NWO VIDI grant. SW is
supported by STW Netherlands, as well as an NWO VIDI and
an ERC Starting Grant. The experimental work was partially
supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (project
SCHN 757/5-1).
Author Contributions
FF and SW conceived the project. FF, CS and SW de-
veloped the security proof, TG and RS were in charge of
the experimental implementation, CP implemented the infor-
mation reconciliation and classical post-processing, and FF
did the numerical simulations. FF wrote and TG edited the
manuscript with contributions from all authors.
[1] S. Wiesner, SIGACT News 15, 78 (1983).
[2] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Proceedings of IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Process-
ing , 175 (1984).
[3] A. Ekert, Physical Review Letters 67, 661 (1991).
[4] D. Mayers, Physical Review Letters 78, 3414 (1997).
[5] D. Mayers, arXiv preprint, arxiv:quant-ph/9603015 (1996).
[6] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Physical Review Letter 78, 3410
(1997).
[7] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena
120, 177 (1998).
[8] H.-K. Lo, Physical Review A 56, 1154 (1997).
[9] G. D’Ariano, D. Kretschmann, D. Schlingemann, and
R. Werner, Physical Review A 76, 032328 (2007).
[10] H. Buhrman, M. Christandl, and C. Schaffner, Physical Review
Letters 109, 160501 (2012).
[11] U. Maurer, Journal of Cryptology 5, 53 (1992).
[12] C. Cachin and U. M. Maurer, in Proceedings of CRYPTO 1997,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (1997) pp. 292–306.
[13] I. B. Damgård, S. Fehr, L. Salvail, and C. Schaffner, SIAM
Journal on Computing 37, 1865 (2008).
10
[14] I. B. Damgård, S. Fehr, R. Renner, L. Salvail, and C. Schaffner,
in Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2007 (Springer, 2007) pp.
360–378.
[15] S. Wehner, C. Schaffner, and B. M. Terhal, Physical Review
Letters 100, 220502 (2008).
[16] T. Gehring, V. Händchen, J. Duhme, F. Furrer, T. Franz,
C. Pacher, R. F. Werner, and R. Schnabel, Nat. Commun. 6
(2015).
[17] J. Kilian, in Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual ACM Sympo-
sium on Theory of Computing (ACM, 1988) pp. 20–31.
[18] S. Wehner, M. Curty, C. Schaffner, and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A
81, 052336 (2010).
[19] N. H. Y. Ng, S. K. Joshi, C. C. Ming, C. Kurtsiefer, and
S. Wehner, Nature Communications 3, 1326 (2012).
[20] R. König, S. Wehner, and J. Wullschleger, IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory 58, 1962 (2012).
[21] M. Berta, O. Fawzi, and S. Wehner, in Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO 2012, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7417
(2012) pp. 776–793.
[22] M. Berta, F. G. Brandao, M. Christandl, and S. Wehner, IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory 59, 6779 (2013).
[23] F. Dupuis, O. Fawzi, and S. Wehner, IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory 61, 1093 (2015).
[24] C. Erven, N. H. Y. Ng, N. Gigov, R. Laflamme, S. Wehner, and
G. Weihs, Nature Communications 5 (2014).
[25] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, Physical Review Let-
ters 47, 777 (1935).
[26] A. Furusawa, J. L. Sørensen, S. L. Braunstein, C. A. Fuchs,
H. J. Kimble, E. S. E. Polzik, and J. Sorensen, Science 282,
706 (1998).
[27] T. Eberle, V. Händchen, and R. Schnabel, Optics Express
(2013), 10.1364/OE.21.011546.
[28] C. Schaffner, Physical Review A 82, 032308 (2010).
[29] M. Tomamichel, Quantum Information Processing with Finite
Resources: Mathematical Foundations, Vol. 5 (Springer, 2015).
[30] V. Giovannetti, A. Holevo, and R. Garcia-Patron, arXiv
preprint, arXiv:1312.2251 (2013).
[31] V. Giovannetti, R. Garcia-Patron, N. Cerf, and A. Holevo,
arXiv preprint, arXiv:1312.6225 (2013).
[32] M. M. Wilde and A. Winter, Problems of Information Trans-
mission 50, 117 (2014).
[33] B. R. Bardhan and M. M. Wilde, Physical Review A 89, 022302
(2014).
[34] B. R. Bardhan, R. Garcia-Patron, M. M. Wilde, and A. Winter,
arXiv preprint, arXiv:1401.4161 (2014).
[35] P. Jouguet, D. Elkouss, and S. Kunz-Jacques, Phys.l Rev. A 90,
042329 (2014).
[36] C. Pacher, J. Martinez-Mateo, J. Duhme, T. Gehring, and
F. Furrer, arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.09140 (2016).
[37] R. Renner and J. I. Cirac, Physical Review Letters 102, 110504
(2009).
[38] L.-M. Duan, G. Giedke, J. Cirac, and P. Zoller, Physical Review
Letters 84, 2722 (2000).
[39] G. Masada, K. Miyata, A. Politi, T. Hashimoto, J. L. O’Brien,
and A. Furusawa, Nature Photonics 9, 316 (2015).
[40] M. Berta, O. Fawzi, and S. Wehner, in Advances in Cryptol-
ogy – CRYPTO 2012, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.
7417, edited by R. Safavi-Naini and R. Canetti (Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2012) pp. 776–793.
[41] M. Tomamichel, R. Colbeck, and R. Renner, IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory 56, 4674 (2010).
[42] N. H. Y. Ng, M. Berta, and S. Wehner, Physical Review A 86,
042315 (2012).
[43] M. Tomamichel, R. Colbeck, and R. Renner, IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory 55, 5840 (2009).
[44] F. Furrer, J. Aberg, and R. Renner, Communications in Mathe-
matical Physics 306, 165 (2011).
[45] H. J. Landau and H. O. Pollak, The Bell System Technical Jour-
nal 65, 43 (1961).
[46] H. Dym and H. P. McKean, Fourier Series and Integrals (Aca-
demic, New York, 1972).
[47] Ł. Rudnicki, Physical Review A 91, 032123 (2015).
[48] E. Kennard, Zeitschrift für Physik 44, 326 (1927).
[49] R. Renner, Security of Quantum Key Distribution, Ph.D. thesis,
ETH Zurich (2005).
[50] M. Tomamichel, R. Colbeck, and R. Renner, Information The-
ory, IEEE Transactions on 55, 5840 (2009).
[51] I. Bialynicki-Birula, Physics Letters 103, 253 (1984).
[52] M. Berta, F. Furrer, and V. B. Scholz, arXiv preprint,
arXiv:1107.5460 (2011).
[53] F. Furrer, T. Franz, M. Berta, A. Leverrier, V. B. Scholz,
M. Tomamichel, and R. F. Werner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 109,
100502 (2012).
